Exchange rates during the crisis by Weber, Sebastian & Wyplosz, Charles
Policy Research Working Paper 5059























































































































dProduced by the Research Support Team
Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Policy Research Working Paper 5059
Nearly two years after the onset of the financial crises, 
many central banks have brought their policy interest 
rates down to, or close to zero. Various governments 
have seen their budget deficits soar. Both policies 
have affected exchange rates, partly through market 
expectations. With a majority of exchange rates officially 
floating, exchange rate movements do not necessarily 
reflect official decisions as was the case in the 1930s. 
Yet, also in the 2008 crisis, authorities have directly 
intervened in the foreign exchange market, sometimes in 
order to defend a falling currency but in other instances 
with the aim to limit appreciation pressure, akin of 
competitive devaluations. This paper documents the 
exchange rate interventions during the height of the 
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2008/09 financial crisis and identifies the countries 
which have particular high incentives to intervene in 
the foreign exchange market to competitively devalue 
their currency. While various countries had increased 
incentives to devalue, we find that direct exchange rate 
interventions have been rather limited and contagion 
of devaluation has been restricted to one regionally 
contained case. However, sharp market-driven exchange 
rate movements have reshaped competitive positions. It 
appears that these movements have so far not seriously 
disrupted global trade. After all, a world crisis is likely to 
require widespread exchange rate adjustments as different 
countries are affected in different ways and have different 
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A key leitmotiv as we go through the crisis is to avoid a repet of the policy mistakes 
of the Great Depression. There is general agreement that beggar-thy-neighbor 
competitive devaluations have been one key mistake, for it led to rising protectionism 
and a deconstruction of international trade (Kindleberger, 1973). Preventing this 
mistake from repeating was a central motivation at the Bretton Woods conference.   
 
Although, there are already signs of increased trade protectionism (Gamberoni and 
Newfarmer, 2009), today’s situation is very different from the 1930s. In the 1930s 
exchange rates were mostly fixed within the prevalent Gold Standard. Depreciations 
were the result of explicit decisions. Today, only some 42% of countries are officially 
pegging their exchange rates although de facto pegging is detected in 45%.
1 This 
means that exchange rate movements do not necessarily reflect official decisions but 
are rather market-driven fluctuations.  
 
Governments today have nominally many more policy tools at hand ranging from 
fiscal policy over labour market to monetary policy measures. This should make them 
less reliant on measures which are perceived as beggar-thy-neighbour. However, 
nearly two years after the onset of the financial crisis, central banks around the world 
have brought their policy interest rates down to, or close to zero. Most countries have 
seen their budget deficits soar, reflecting both the automatic stabilizers and various 
degrees of discretionary actions.  
 
While the recession is still under way, traditional instruments become severely 
constrained. In such a situation, it is natural that national authorities explore non-
conventional policies. Central banks are experimenting with quantitative easing and 
credit easing. There is no guarantee that either type of non-conventional monetary 
policy will be successful; the Japanese precedent is not particularly encouraging 
either. Another non-conventional form of monetary policy is deliberately weakening 
of the exchange rate. This raises the specter of the much-feared beggar-thy-neighbor 
policies. Exchange rates have moved a lot since the onset of the crisis, but these 
movements have been mostly interpreted as byproducts of expansionary policies. 
Sharp depreciations in countries like the UK or South Korea have not been welcome 
by the authorities, at least officially. Intentions, of course, are hard to detect and no 
one suggests that monetary policies should not be expansionary.  
 
This paper examines the many questions that surround explicit or implicit exchange 
rate policies as the crisis continues. We start by discussing briefly the desirable 
evolution of exchange rates from a global perspective and the exchange rate 
consequences of traditional measures. Section 3 contrasts this global perspective with 
the incentives that operate on the level of the individual countries. We offer a measure 
of incentives to derive which countries have a particular interest in a relatively lower 
value of their own currency. In Section 4, we examine to which extent the deliberate 
or merely market-driven occurrence of depreciations by a single country can lead to 
counter-depreciations initiating a contagious process that characterized the 1930s. We 
examine two possibilities. The first one involves competitive depreciations among the 
                                                 
1 The defacto number is based on the updated Reinhart and Rogoff classification (2004). An updated 
defacto classification by Ghosh (2003) puts this number somewhat higher with close to 50%. 3 
 
46 large, systemically important countries. The alternative is competitive 
depreciations starting among smaller, non systemically important countries spreading 
to more and more countries until it engulfs the whole world. Section 5 brings together 
the previous results to examine and evaluate possible actions that would remove the 
exchange rate from becoming an aggravating factor as the world hopefully comes to 
grip with the recession. Obviously, there is no miracle solution but a number of 
measures may mitigate the risks.  
 
2. Desirable exchange rate policies 
Since the onset of the crisis exchange rates have moved sharply. As figure 1 shows, 
the average absolute monthly change in the exchange rate relative to the US dollar for 
a sample of major export countries has increased sharply indicating a higher volatility 
in exchange rate markets.
2 Moreover the average change for the countries amounted 
to an 8% depreciation at its peak in 2008.
3  
 
Figure 1: Exchange Rate Developments 
 
 
Source: IFS and own calculation.  
 
 
A significant literature (e.g. Roubini and Stetser, 2004; Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2005; 
Blanchard et al., 2005) has long argued that global imbalances – the combination of a 
large US current account deficit with Asian surpluses – were unsustainable and would 
result, sooner or later, into large exchange rate realignments, with potentially dramatic 
                                                 
2 We concentrate on the 46 most important export countries, measured in exports in percentage of 
world exports. Results are unaffected when considering a broader set of countries.    
3 Note that when the two values are identical all countries in the sample appreciated (or remained 
unchanged) against the US in the respective year. This is two times the case: in M11 2004 and right 
after the outbreak of the crisis in M10 2007. In our sample it is never the case that all countries 
depreciate against the US Dollar in a given month. 4 
 
effects. Now that the crisis has happened, this view argues for monitoring exchange 
rates to make sure that they move in the right direction. This leads to reasonably 
simple conclusions. In particular the US dollar needs to depreciate to eliminate the 
current account deficit and the Asian currencies, chiefly the Chinese renmimbi, must 
appreciate to reduce their surpluses. Ominously, the dollar has appreciated and several 
Asian currencies – but not the renmimbi – have nearly crashed.  
 
However, the crisis has happened to a great extent for other reasons. Indeed, another 
literature initially claimed that the imbalances could be sustained long enough not to 
call for massive realignments (Dooley et al., 2003; Caballero et al., 2006). This 
alternative literature holds that the global imbalances are not a cause of the crisis but a 
symptom of other disequilibria originating in the financial markets in the US and 
elsewhere (Dooley et al., 2009; Caballero et al., 2009). In that view the exchange rates 
cannot play center stage in resolving the underlying disequilibria. Their desirable 
evolution must be based on other criteria.  
 
Whichever literature holds true, there is a case for a desirable evolution of exchange 
rates, from a world welfare viewpoint, which facilitates the international adjustment 
to shocks and disequilibria. But given that the sources of the disequilibria are not 
generally agreed upon, pinpointing the solution for the required path is far too 
complex a task making a coordinated response close to impossible. Under this 
uncertainty, using explicitly the exchange rate should be a last-resort option, since it 
can be helpful only if few countries adopt it and is at the cost of other nations’ 
competitiveness. It follows that other options must be implemented first.  
 
2.1. The traditional monetary policy option 
Obviously, the first instrument is monetary policy. However, an easier monetary 
policy through interest rate cuts is also expected to be accompanied by an exchange 
rate depreciation. In fact, the depreciation is the main channel of monetary policy in 
small open economies. This implies that a fully coordinated monetary expansion 
would translate into exchange rate changes only to the extent that their magnitude 
differ from one country to another. It follows that monetary policies will have to be 
primarily on other channels. All these channels involve the banking and financial 
systems. In most developed countries, these systems are impaired and demand for 
credit is highly subdued. This is why we observe a massive accumulation of liquidity 
in banks with little credit expansion. In developing countries, financial systems are 
small and unlikely to transmit the expansion.  
 
Thus monetary policy is likely to work mostly in a small number of developed and 
emerging-market countries that have sufficiently robust banking systems. If this 
conclusion is warranted, it follows that the other countries will benefit from the 
monetary policy instrument to the extent that they depreciate relatively to the 
countries that can rely on the domestic banking channel.  
 
2.2. The fiscal policy option 
The second conventional instrument is fiscal policy. It is a complex instrument whose 
effects are surprisingly little known, in spite of decades of theoretical and empirical 5 
 
research.
4 However, there is a compelling case that fiscal policy is hampered in very 
open economies as a significant part of any boost is bound to leak abroad in the form 
of imports. This risk is magnified in countries where the exchange rate freely floats if 
a fiscal expansion triggers an appreciation.
5 Despite these misgivings, it is the only 
conventional macroeconomic instrument left and it should be used wherever 
governments can borrow substantial amounts.  
 
The optimal world distribution of fiscal policy effort should recognize the room for 
maneuver (pre-existing debt, ability to borrow, administrative capacity). While we 
know far too little about the impact of fiscal policies on exchange rate changes, the 
safe conclusion is that exchange rates should be stabilized. Put different, if we are 
going to rely mostly on fiscal policies, hopefully coordinated, the exchange rate 
should be a playing field as neutral as is possible. Countries that can undertake such 
policies, with positive externalities for those that cannot, should be protected from 
potentially offsetting appreciations likely to deter policy action in the first place.  
 
3. Country-level incentives  
With policy rates approaching the zero lower bound and budget deficits soaring, 
policy options become severely constrained. Additionally, policies like fiscal 
expansion have to be paid at a national level, while their benefits can dilute away to 
other nations, which makes more direct measures attractive. Many developed and 
emerging markets have been hit hard by dropping export revenues as a result of the 
global contraction and falling prices for major export products. To ease the domestic 
adjustment burden, several countries have an incentive to manage their exchange rate 
in such a manner that their economies remain competitive. This appears to come at no 
cost and promises to have a direct impact. However, such a step puts other nations at a 
disadvantage and imposes on them a disproportionally higher adjustment burden. The 
consequence is that the behavior of few countries could be contagious.   
 
The likelihood of engaging in exchange rate depreciation policies can be seen as a 
function of the associated cost and benefits, the range of alternative options to choose 
from and political will to engage in actions perceived as beggar-thy-neighbour. The 
benefits should be increasing in both, the importance of the external trade balance for 
total output and the elasticity of the trade balance to exchange rate changes. The costs 
are increasing in the level of foreign currency indebtness and the threat of rising 
inflation.  
 
The alternative options that are available will also play a key role in defining whether 
policy makers will embark on direct exchange rate intervention or not. Within the 
group of the major export nations, some countries are already heavily constrained in 
the extent to which they can choose from various macroeconomic policy options. 
Countries which: (1) are close to the zero lower bound interest rate loose the classical 
monetary policy channel (2) have a very high public debt ratio may not want to 
increase future debt burdens even more, making fiscal expansion less likely (3) expect 
low inflation rates are more likely to increase the monetary mass since the output 
                                                 
4 As recently observed by Yung Chul Park, the IMF’s World Economic Outlook concludes in its 
October 2008 issue that fiscal policy is largely ineffective while it finds it effective in its April 2009 
version.  
5 The Mundell-Fleming model predicts a 100% offset that makes fiscal policy wholly ineffective.  6 
 
Source: EIU (Apr. 2009), no forecast is 
available for Kuwait  . 
concerns tend to outweigh the inflation concerns and deflation worries may even 
make depreciations more likely.  
 
The political willingness to engage in a devaluation may be captured to some extent 
by the past experience of exchange rate misalignment. Finally, there must be a strong 
enough incentive to engage in expansionary policies in the first place, which may be 
captured by the expected growth slowdown.  
 
3.1. Evaluation of incentives 
The outlook matters a lot as authorities evaluate their options. Since the onset of the 
crisis, economic forecasting has proven to be extremely difficult, if not impossible. 
Output and inflation forecasts have constantly been revised, by large margins, within 
very short periods and always downward. This is normal as the forecasting models 
either rely on econometric estimates from sample periods that do not include a crisis 
of the kind that is unfolding, or are based on theoretical models that do not allow for 
any of the on-going events (bubbles, financial meltdown, seizure of financial markets) 
and the policy responses so far. In Figure 2, we use forecasts provided by the 
Economist Intelligence Unit as an illustration of the issues at stake, while warning that 
these forecasts can prove to be as unreliable as the recent ones. For half the countries 
in our sample of exporters, output is predicted to contract by more than 5 percentage 
points. Only seven countries are expected to register a non-negative growth rate.  
 
Figure 2: GDP growth      Figure 3: Interest rates and inflation 
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Source: Interest Rate is the policy rate as of 
Apr. 2009 (Central Banks) and inflation is the 
latest figure from EIU (Apr. 2009) 7 
 
The largest drops in output growth are expected to occur in various Asian countries 
including Japan, Thailand and Singapore as well as in Argentina and Venezuela.  
 
Interest rates and Inflation 
Figure 3 shows that interest rates are close or below 1% in more than half of the 
countries of our sample. Only six of these countries have an inflation rate in excess of 
1%, which means that many of the countries that have hit the lower bound still face 
positive real interest rates. The list of countries which are close to the zero lower 
bound includes most developed countries: the US, Japan, the UK, Canada, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Singapore and Hong Kong.  
 
Deficits and debts 
Debt as a percent of GDP in our sample stands on average at 46%. Most prominently, 
in Japan and Singapore debt levels exceed 100% of GDP.
6 Both countries are 
expected to experience a severe output contraction in 2009 and have seen their 
competitiveness seriously eroded (Figure 7). European countries tend also to have a 
relative high debt level, in particular Italy, Greece and Belgium. Finally, some 
emerging markets including Hungary, Israel and India belong to the group of high 
debt countries. Given the recent world wide fiscal expansion these figures will 
increase over the next year by several percentage points. 
 
Figure 4: Debt and net foreign assets  Figure 5: Current account balance  
Publ. Debt and Net Ext. Pos. (in % of GDP)
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Source: BIS (2008 Q3) and CIA Factbook (2008)                  Source: WEO, pre-crisis levels (2006) 
 
                                                 
6 Despite this fact, Japan already decided to increase its deficits to new record levels. 8 
 
Current account and external positions 
While there may be several countries that benefit from more competitive exchange 
rates others do all to avoid a depreciation of their currency. Unsurprisingly, these are 
primarily countries in Central and Eastern Europe who have accumulated high foreign 
liabilities often due to the anticipated euro accession and the favourable interest rate 
differentials. For these countries any depreciation increases the foreign currency debt 
and thereby threatens the stability of their financial sector. Hungary features in our 
sample with a relative high net foreign liability, as measured by the external position 
vis-à-vis BIS reporting banks relative to GDP (50%). The levels for Poland (15%) and 
the Czech Republic (13%) as well as Korea (19%) and the Ukraine (18%) appear to 
be less worrisome. The bulk of countries with high net external liabilities are the EU 
countries and Norway. On the other hand, countries with a positive net external 
position do not suffer any (aggregate) losses from exchange rate depreciations. This 
group includes highly integrated countries like Switzerland, Hong Kong, Singapore 
and Belgium but also countries like Venezuela, Israel and Saudi Arabia. 
 
In terms of trade pattern, the 4 countries which have the highest export to GDP ratio 
(Singapore, Hong Kong, Luxemburg, Malaysia and Belgium) used to maintain on 
average current account surpluses well above 10%.
7 Other countries with so high 
current account surpluses are the oil producers, Switzerland and China. Interestingly, 
the countries for which exports appear to contribute less to GDP are also the countries 
with the highest current account deficits. In fact, in our sample there is a significant 
positive correlation between the pre-crisis current account surplus and the importance 
of exports in GDP measured in % of GDP. To the extent that exchange rate 
depreciation boost exports, this implies that countries, which have more to gain from 
a 1% increase in exports, tend to have already a current account surplus.  
 
Exchange rates: initial situation and recent changes 
At the onset to the crisis various countries have been said to maintain undervalued 
exchange rates by not allowing their nominal exchange rate to depreciate and thereby 
contributing to the global imbalances. To measure this extent of misalignment we use 
a simple extended PPP approach to estimate the equilibrium rate along the lines of 
Cheung et al (2008). The approach chosen here is based on the consideration that the 
evolution of the real exchange rate is a function of (slow moving) factors affecting the 
equilibrium exchange rate and factors, which in the short-run lead to a deviation from 
the equilibrium rate.
8 These deviations may be a result of country specific policies 
such as the accumulation of foreign reserves. The misalignment may then be 
interpreted as the percentage deviation of the actual real exchange rate from the 
predicted rate, where the prediction is based on letting only the changes in the 




One of the findings of this analysis is that defacto floats – as theory predicts – do in 
fact equilibrate better than pegged regimes in the sense that we find less evidence of 
misalignment for these countries. Figure 6 indicates the point estimate as well as a 
country specific confidence interval, based on 2 standard deviations of the country 
                                                 
7 Using the trade balance rather than the current account would be no less impressive. 
8 For a more detailed description of the approach we chose in measuring exchange rate misalignment 
see Appendix A and B. 9 
 
specific errors.
9 Of the defacto floater in our sample with the exception of Turkey that 
we find highly overvalued, Japan, South Africa, Australia are not misaligned. On the 
other side, all major exporting countries that maintain a defacto peg are found to have 
been highly misaligned in 2007. This group is composed of China, Hong Kong, Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait, the Ukraine and Denmark. There is also evidence that countries with 
current account deficits tend to have overvalued currencies (including Poland, Czech 
Republic, Greece, Portugal, Spain and Turkey). On the other hand the undervalued-
currency countries tend to have trade surpluses (China, Malaysia, Singapore, 
Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Chile). They have higher reserve coffers and are 
unlikely to switch quickly from export driven to internal, consume driven growth.  
 
 Figure 6: Initial misalignment             Figure 7: Recent exchange rate changes 
     M isalignment (in % dev from eq. 2007)
undervalued                         overvalued 
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   Source: See Appendix A and B         Source: BIS, IFS and own calculation 
 
Recent Changes 
The recent changes in exchange rates have been mitigating the undervaluation in 
instances where nations pegged to the dollar and currencies moved nearly one-for-one 
(China, Singapore, Saudi Arabia). This appears to be true when measuring the 
adjustment in terms of the real exchange rate, the nominal rate with respect to the 
dollar or in terms of the ECI an index which captures the nominal third market 
competitiveness of a country.
10 Surprisingly perhaps, the currencies that float more 
freely against the dollar have mostly depreciated in 2008, thus deepening the further 
undervaluation in certain cases. This concerns Chile, Indonesia and to a lesser extent 
                                                 
9 The parameter uncertainty is given by the black left and right lines to the mid point estimate. 
Generally these tend to be very low. 
10 The ECI is described in more detail in the next section. 10 
 
Malaysia. Euro zone members that already appeared overvalued do seem to be on the 
loosing end, since the Euro remains relatively stable, while neighbouring European 
countries, like Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom are benefiting from their 
depreciated rates. While these developments are to some extent in line with the 
adjustment of global imbalances, this is not entirely the case.
11 Both the US dollar and 
the Euro appear to be too strong, given the external position of the US and most Euro 
zone members. 
 
3.2. Incentive Index 
We bring these various incentives now together by computing a single index based on 
the above observations. The index, which is designed to gauge incentives to 
depreciate, is computed as the simple average of the ranks of each country along the 
eight criteria: the nominal interest rate, the inflation rate, the inverse of the export to 
GDP ratio, the pre crisis extent of undervaluation, the inverse of the public debt level, 
the negative value of the net foreign asset position, the expected drop in output 
growth and the negative value of the change in the ECI.
12 Thus a lower (more 
negative) value implies a stronger incentive to depreciate and is therefore associated 
with a higher rank. The index ranges from a minimum of 1, the highest possible 
incentive to depreciate, to 46.
13 
 
Clearly, this index should be interpreted with care. To start with, the criteria are 
equally weighed, which simply reflects the absence of strong priors. It can well be 
that different countries attach different importance to the criteria. In addition, the 
index does not account for other potentially important factors like the presence of a 
financial centre or heterogeneity within a country. One could also note that using rank 
order may underplay the differences among the country performances.  
 
Keeping those caveats in mind, it is worth noting that the group of countries with the 
highest incentive includes two countries, Switzerland and Singapore, which have 
already taken (limited) action to weaken their exchange rates. At the other end of the 
spectrum, we find Ukraine, which has already seen its exchange rate depreciate by 
roughly 35% and is therefore unlikely to see further changes. That they are at the two 
extremes is explained by the fact that Ukraine’s devaluation is already accounted for 
while Singapore and Switzerland’s devaluations are not registered in the exchange 
rate indicator, since they took place in April and March of 2009, respectively. 
Additionally, the extent of the devaluation in Switzerland and Singapore were rather 
low and do not preclude future devaluations, while this is considered unlikely for the 
Ukraine with relative high inflation and negative net foreign assets.  
 
It is interesting to note that China is found to have a rather high incentive to 
depreciate. China’s exchange rate policy is a very sensitive issue, though, which may 
explain why it has recently chosen to adopt a very expansionary fiscal policy. This 
might temporarily reduce global imbalances, but large surpluses could reappear once 
                                                 
11 In particular the US dollar should be depreciating against most Asian currencies. 
12 We also explored other methods, for example ascribing values to the top ten (quartile) and bottom 
ten (quartile) countries for each criterion. The results for the upper and lower group are essentially 
unaffected.   
13 For Kuwait we had not enough data to compute the ECI and there was no growth prediction 
available. For the US we have no measure of misalignment. The two countries’ index value is therefore 
based on the remaining sub-indices. 11 
 
the fiscal boost comes to an end. This could rekindle demands that it appreciates. 
Given its large reserves, however, China stands to suffer serious losses were it to let 
its currency appreciate against the dollar.  
 
Meanwhile, China’s stance on the exchange rate is exerting a powerful influence 
throughout East Asia. Some countries, for instance Korea, have experienced deep 
depreciations, which may be paradoxically raising China’s competitiveness since 
much of its export goods incorporate parts manufactured elsewhere in the region. But 
China’s goods also enter the production chain of other East Asian countries, thus 
reducing the competitiveness gains from depreciation.  
 
Other countries found to have a high incentive to devalue include Japan, Thailand, 
Israel, Malaysia Saudi Arabia, the United States and Germany, which is however 
constrained by the common monetary policy of the euro area. From an economic 
perspective it may be highly tempting for Japan to devalue in the current situation, but 
the political cost is potentially much higher. However, in the case of Japan and the US 
a further increase in the monetary mass, which may eventually lead to a depreciation, 
seems much more likely since it is not associated with the stigma of being beggar-thy-
neighbour. Finally, it is worth noting that many emerging markets and Australia, 
which have recently been depreciating heavily, feature at the end of the list.  
 
Brazil, Mexico, Argentina 
and Chile have been 
depreciating heavily last year. 
While this development 
seems consistent with the 
external position of Mexico 
and Brazil and their real 
exchange rates that have been 
above equilibrium levels 
(though insignificantly so) for 
Chile developments are 
contributing to an already 
competitive exchange rate. 
However, for none of these 
countries do we find a strong 
incentive to devalue, 
primarily since policy options 
are not (yet) constrained and 
competitiveness is already 
relative high given the recent 
depreciations. 
 
Raw material exporters, 
which peg or maintain a band 
to the US dollar including 
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, 
could devalue as it already happened in Kazakhstan and Ukraine, two other raw 
material exporters. However, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have a relatively high buffer 
of reserves and low debt burdens, which should induce them to rely more on a fiscal 
Incentive Index 


































































































Figure 8: Incentive Index 12 
 
stimulus as opposed to monetary policy actions. Nevertheless, they may be tempted, 
since both countries have lost competitiveness in recent months by pegging to the US 
dollar and interest rates in both countries are already very low.   
 
All in all, the incentive index provides a disquieting picture. Some of the most 
important world exporters, in particular Singapore, Hong Kong, China, Japan and the 
US, are found to face powerful incentives to seek a weakening of their exchange rates.  
 
4. Contagion 
The rising incentives to maintain a competitive exchange rate have already led to first 
explicit steps. Since the end of 2008, at least 9 countries officially devalued their 
exchange rate as shown in Table 1. Within the last year nearly all major export 
nations’ currencies have weakened against the US dollar. However, it is very difficult 
to distinguish between explicit exchange rate decisions and the exchange rate 
implication of monetary policy actions if countries maintain a (managed) float. In 
some cases (Sweden and the United Kingdom), it is clear that this is the outcome of 
monetary policy actions. In other cases (Russia and several CIS countries), the 
authorities have tried to prevent or slow down the depreciations and ended up 
attempting to control the process. A few countries (Vietnam, Singapore and, 
Switzerland) have taken explicit steps. In some cases, the instauration of capital 
controls show that the depreciations were not welcome at all. Argentina, on the other 
hand, has lifted its controls.   
 
Are these developments a source of concern? Not as long as they remain limited 
because they are accepted as a consequence of the situation (like Iceland’s massive 
depreciation) or of domestically-oriented policies. As emphasized earlier, there exists 
a pattern of exchange rate changes that is justified. However, the movements in a 
situation of global output decline bear the risk that some large exporters feel 
threatened and respond. A second risk is that exchange rate decisions among small 
countries trigger a bottom-up reaction chain. 
 
4.1. Contagion risks among major export countries 
Devaluations by major export nations are likely to disrupt trade patterns.  Recent 
movements of nominal exchange rates have already significantly shifted the 
competitiveness of countries. To shed some light on these changes we look at a 
measure of effective exchange rate which we call ECI (External Competitiveness 
Index) designed to reflect third market effects.
14 Rather than contrasting the relative 
competitiveness of exports to imports as a nominal effective exchange rate does, the 
index compares the competitiveness of the own exports relative to the exports of the 
competitors in third markets based on the changes in the nominal exchange rates with 
respect to the destination currency. This implies that one countries 
devaluation/depreciation worsens the competitors’ situation, which is reflected in an 
increase in the ECI, even if the own exchange rate with respect to the destination 
market remained unchanged. A drastic increase in the ECI level can hence be seen as 
reflecting an increased risk of devaluation due to 3
rd market effects, i.e. contagion.  
                                                 
14 See Appendix C for details.  13 
 
Table 1. Foreign Exchange Market Outcomes Since End 2008  
              
   Measures Taken Since End 2008 (Indicative, non exhaustive list)    
   Exchange Rate    
   Date  Country  Measure    
  
Oct. 2008  Iceland  Failed attempt to introduce currency peg as capital 
flight lead to heavy deprecation    
   Dec. 2008  Angola  Devaluation (10%)    
   Dec. 2008  Ukraine  Devaluation (30%)    
   Jan.  2009  Belarus  Devaluation (20%)    
   Feb. 2009  Argentina  "Managed (gradual)" Depreciation    
   Feb. 2009  Russia  "Managed (gradual)" Depreciation    
   Feb. 2009  Kazakhstan  Devaluation (18%)    
   Mar. 2009  Armenia   Devaluation (30%)    
   Mar. 2009  Switzerland  Devaluation (5%)    
   Mar. 2009  Vietnam  Widening of Exchange Rate Band    
   Apr. 2009  Singapore  Lowering of the trading band (<2%)    
   Apr. 2009  Fiji  Devaluation (20%)    
   Capital Account and Forex    
   Date  Country  Measure    
  
Oct. 2008  Iceland  Controls restricting foreign exchange purchases for 
essential items such as food, fuel and medicine. ll 
foreign currency acquired by domestic parties must 
be submitted to a domestic financial undertaking 
within two weeks. Other restrictions on capital 
movements.    
  
Dec. 2008  Ukraine  Restriction on Forex Sales and Purchase. Parliament 
has voted in a first reading for a law that would force 
all exporters to convert their foreign currency earnings 
back into hryvnias.     
   Feb. 2009  Nigeria  Prevent foreign exchange dealing between banks    
   Feb. 2009  Venezuela  Limits on purchase of "Travel" Dollars    
   Mar. 2009  Angola  Tightening of Forex Controls    
  
Mar. 2009  Kazakhstan  Approval of reading of new law in parliament on 
capital controls    
  
Mar. 2009  Zambia  Ban on foreign borrowing in local currency and on the 
use of US dollar or other forex in domestic 
transaction.    
  
Mar. 2009  Vietnam  "Punishment" for bank trading outside the exchange 
rate band    
  
Mar. 2009  Uzbekistan  Bank clients must use all foreign currency within 
seven days after purchasing it, otherwise they are 
obligated to sell it back to the banks.    
   Mar. 2009  Argentina  Lift of former capital controls from 2005    
  
Apr. 2009  Bolivia  Bolivia's Central Bank is banning banks from buying 
or selling U.S. dollars for much more or less than the 
official exchange rate.     
   Apr. 2009  Kazakhstan  Limitation on forex trading at exchange offices.    
              
 
In general the variability of industrial countries’ ECIs have been moderate. So have 
been the ECIs of countries that peg to the US dollar (China, Hong Kong, Saudi 14 
 
Arabia). However, towards the end of the period it becomes clear that Germany, 
Switzerland and the US have lost in competitiveness since other countries have been 
depreciating heavily (like the UK, Sweden and Australia). Hence, the latter countries 
gain in competitiveness has heightened the others incentive to weaken their own 
currency. However, in no instance do the measures imply an extremely high loss of 
competitiveness for industrial countries. The exception is Japan that saw its ECI value 
climb by more than 20% in the last months of 2008 reflecting to some extent its 
appreciation against the US dollar but also the appreciation with respect to major 
trading partners in Asia, in particular Korea which after the US and China is the most 
important export market of Japan. Hence, even though Korea’s depreciation was 
market driven it has increased the contagion risk for Japan to devalue.   
 
Figure 9: ECI values for selected Industrial countries 
 
 
A similar pattern can be observed in other Asian countries that did not experience a 
depreciation. In particular China, Singapore and Hong Kong and the Philippines have 
lost competitiveness in the last months of 2008. This may induce them to follow their 
regional competitors, which depreciated strongly including South Korea and 
Indonesia and to a lesser extent India.  
 
Figure 10: ECI values for selected Asian countries 
 
For Latin American countries, ECI values have dropped strongly throughout 2008 and 
in particular the second half of 2008. Brazil’s competitiveness has recently improved 
but not enough to fully offset earlier losses from the disinflation years. Chile, 
Venezuela and Argentina have rather low ECI values. Similarly, the recent 15 
 
depreciation of the Mexican peso contributed to a relatively low ECI. Hence, from 
Mexico and major exporters from Latin America there seems to be stemming no risk 
of contagion via the exchange rate devaluations since they have already a relatively 
competitive exchange rate with respect to their direct competitors. 
 
Figure 11: ECI values for selected Latin American and CIS countries 
 
From the major export nations stems only limited contagion incentives. These tend 
also to be limited to Asia. However, if Japan and China were jointly to devalue ECI 
values for several non-Asian countries, in particular Mexico, Canada and most Latin 
American countries would increase significantly. This is due to the high share of 
Japan and China in US imports (>20%) and the high importance of the US market for 
Mexico, Canada and Latin American countries with a share that exceeds often 80% of 
total exports. Hence, the highest risk of contagion stems from these two countries 
since they both have an incentive and are big enough to trigger retaliation by other 
countries. 
 
4.2. Bottom-up contagion 
While a devaluation by a major nation is more likely to trigger contagion, smaller 
nations may also be at the root of the process. Countries that are minor players in 
global trade can tip of a depreciation process via third market competition effects. 
This could cumulate to take on a global significance once a crucial mass is reached. 
Since the end of 2008 several non-systemically important countries have been 
devaluing their currency, as Table 1 illustrates. These countries have been primarily 
raw material exporters.   
 
A few developments in non-systemically important countries indicate that the threat 
of contagion remains relevant. The developments in Russia and the CIS provide an 
example of how contagion takes place and may continue. The managed depreciation 
of the rouble and the devaluation of Ukraine raised the two countries’ competitiveness 
(Figure 11). As consequence, Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan lost 
between 10-30% of competitiveness as indicated by the jump in their ECI value. 
Belarus devalued in January followed by Kazakhstan in February and, Armenia in 
March 2009. Azerbaijan and Georgia did not follow suite yet, but their situation has 
become increasingly uncomfortable, with ECI values, being relatively high.  
 
In Africa, the two largest economies have undergone sharp exchange rate fluctuations. 
After Nigeria’s currency appreciated in 2008, leading to a loss of competitiveness, the 
central bank allowed the Naira to depreciate heavily (ca. 25%) in the beginning of 16 
 
2009. Nigeria is an important exporter to various Western African states. The latter 
saw their ECI values increase with the one of Nigeria before the heavy depreciation of 
Nigeria. With the depreciation of the Naira several countries in the region lost 
somewhat in competitiveness, which increases in turn their incentive to devalue.  
 
Figure 12: ECI values for selected African countries 
 
 
South Africa has also been depreciating by close to 25% since the end of 2007. Given 
South Africa’s importance in many Southern African markets, like Mozambique, 
Malawi, Namibia, Zimbabwe and Zambia and to a lesser extent Tanzania and Kenya a 
change in the value of the South African Rand directly impacts the respective 
countries competitiveness.
15 This is since South Africa is both a major destination for 
exports from other Southern African countries but makes also up for a major share in 
imports in these countries. In fact in the last three months of the sample the ECI value 
of South Africa drops heavily while the respective values of Malawi and Mozambique 
rebounded upwards. Zambia and Kenya, though less affected by the recent changes 
remain less competitive.  
 
With the exception of the CIS there has been no other contagion yet. However, the 
exchange rate changes by some regionally important countries have put other small 
countries under increasing pressure. If such a trend will continue the step to another 
regional contagion is not big and may trigger even reactions outside the region given 
the inter-linkages of trade patterns across the globe.  
 
5. Conclusions exploring possible policy responses 
Few countries so far have used direct foreign exchange interventions and there has 
only been one, regionally contained, case of contagion. Most of the recent strong 
exchange rate variations have been brought about by market forces and have not been 
the result of competitive devaluations. Nevertheless, some of these sharp exchange 
rate changes create difficulties for partner countries by altering adversely their 
competitiveness. However, it is close to impossible to give precise recommendations 
regarding the desired exchange rate movements due to the combination of a numerous 
factors that require exchange rate adjustments and of very limited knowledge of what 
drives exchange rates and how they affect the economy. 
 
5.1. Exchange rate regimes 
                                                 
15 However, some countries peg to the South African Rand including Namibia. 17 
 
 
The old case for flexible exchange rate has been controversial for so long that there is 
no hope to draw firm conclusions. Paradoxically perhaps in the midst of extreme 
financial market dislocation, flexible currencies have tended to move in the right 
direction, if not by the right amount. Misalignments are more prevalent among 
defacto fixers. On the other side, if we fear beggar-thy-neighbor behavior, lack of 
activism among the fixers could be seen as reassuring, unless it leads to deeper duress 
as the recession sets in.  
 
An additional advantage of fixed exchange rates in the current situation is that allows 
external observers to identify deliberate actions by the authorities. This allows the 
IMF to use the surveillance mechanism to discuss the issue with the authorities and, 
hopefully, to thwart or reduce damaging beggar-thy-neighbour actions.  
 
Finally, exchange rate stability stands to enhance fiscal policy effectiveness. If as 
argued in Section 2.2 fiscal policy is going to be the main countercyclical instrument, 
stabilizing exchange rates is desirable.  
 
5.2. Global imbalances 
Comparing recent changes and the initial current account position, there is no clear 
sign that exchange rates have moved to eliminate the global imbalances. Strong 
surplus countries have often seen their currencies depreciate or deliberately devalued 
them. The awkwardness of the situation is that while a depreciating dollar would be 
helpful in the adjustment of global imbalances, at the same time there is resistance to 
a depreciating dollar since it implies a loss in national wealth for the surplus countries 
that have accumulated dollar-denominated assets. A dollar depreciation would also 
raise the adjustment burden for the euro zone and Japan.  
 
This means that there can well be a trade-off between exchange rate changes required 
to alleviate the crisis and those that would move in the direction of resolving the 
global imbalances. If one believes that the global imbalances are the source of the 
crisis, then the priority should go in this direction. If one sees the global imbalances as 
a separate problem resulting from fundamental disequilibria, the guiding principle 
should be in helping to bring effectively the world to the end of the recession.  
 
5.3. Allocation of exchange rate adjustments 
Because there is simply no way to allocate desirable exchange rate changes across 
countries, no such effort should be undertaken. Even among the key leading 
exporters, agreeing on an efficient burden sharing is unlikely to be feasible in theory, 
not to mention political considerations. On the other hand, our review of incentives to 
depreciate suggest that the risk is high that some authorities resort to beggar-thy-
neighbor policies. Even though, so far, large exchange rate changes have not triggered 
any contagion (with the exception of the CIS), the risk that they will may well rise as 
governments run out of better options. To reduce the odds of conflictual use of 
exchange rates, some form of coordination is needed. We consider three possibilities. 
 
First, all countries that operate a flexible exchange rate regime should agree to refrain 
from non-conventional monetary easing via the foreign exchange market. Similarly, 
countries with fixed exchange rates – no matter how fixed they are – should not 
undertake any depreciation without in-depth consultations with the IMF.  18 
 
 
Second, when market pressure threatens a currency, whether the exchange rate floats 
or is fixed, IMF support should be sought and provided. Lending should come along 
with the conditions that ensure a behavior that is consistent with the external balance 
and repayment capability, but should not be encompassing any other dimension. If 
conditionality is too broad, many countries could be reluctant to opt for IMF support 
and could prefer instead to act unilaterally. The recently created Flexible Credit 
Facility should be offered to most countries that had achieved a reasonable degree of 
policy discipline before the crisis.  
 
Finally, capital controls need to me monitored to avoid measures which interfere with 
trade and may backfire. Capital controls have been used partly to complement the 
exchange rate adjustments (Iceland, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Vietnam and Angola) and 
partly as a substitute for such adjustments (Nigeria, Venezuela, Zambia and Bolivia). 
In the first case, the controls often serve as a mean to defend the newly established 
exchange rate value while, in the second case, they serve to limit market pressure and 
to avoid a rapid depletion of foreign exchange reserves. If effective, temporary capital 
controls can be helpful. But they can also cause disruptions and hamper the allocation 
of funds. Indeed, black markets have been on the rise in most of the nations that 
implemented the capital controls, undermining the controls and supporting illegal 
activities leaving little but a premium on the transaction behind. Additionally, controls 
that require exporters to convert foreign currency revenues within a short period into 
local currency are likely to disrupt trade in an environment where revenues and 
expenditures do naturally not coincide and where exporters are paying part of their 
imports and required services in foreign currency. Capital controls can be beneficial if 
geared at short term financial capital outflow (like liquidation of equity investment) 
but may be doing more harm than good if affecting the regular foreign currency 
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Appendix 
A. Data Sources 
Data comes from various sources.  
Variable Source  Variable    Source 
Tables  Annual data for the Regression 
Exports    REER, CPI and Reserves IFS 
Current Account    RER  Own calc. (IFS) 
Public Debt  CIA Factbook  CA Openness  Chinn and Ito 
Interest Rates  Central Banks  Gov. Share   
Infl. and GDP growth forecast  EIU  GDP, P-Level, Trade Open.  WB WDI 
Reserves and Nom. Ex. Rate  IFS  ECI computation 
NEER and REER BIS Bilat.  Trade COMTRADE 
Current GDP and GDP growth  IMF WEO Nom. Exchange Rate IFS 
 
B. The Estimation of the Real Equilibrium Exchange Rate 
The estimation of the real equilibrium exchange rate is based on an extended PPP 
approach similar to Cheung et al (2008). The particular approach chosen here is based 
on the consideration that the evolution of the real exchange rate is a function of (slow 
moving) factors affecting the equilibrium exchange rate Xit and factors which in the 
short- to medium run lead to a deviation from the equilibrium rate of which we 
attempt to explain a part by policy variables Zit and consider the remainder as random 




However, we do not impose slope homogeneity on the policy variable, but let it 
instead vary by country.




where  Zi is the average value of the policy variable for country i. The standard 
misalignment measure is given by: 
 
MISAit=RERit - RERit = yi(Zit - Zi)+eit 
 
or in percentage, reflecting the extent of misalignment (i.e. overvaluation): 
 
SMISAit = (RERit /RERit -1)*100 =  100 * [yi(Zit - Zi)+eit] / RERit  
 
For the empirical implementation we use the following controls Xit=(PRODit, OPENit, 
KAOPENit,  GOVit).  PRODit is the traditional Balassa-Samuelson effect; that the 
equilibrium rate moves with increased development, since the tradable good sector is 
driving growth. The measure we employ is the GDP per capita in current US Dollars 
relative to the US.
17 OPENit stands for the extent to which the country is integrated in 
the world market allowing for cheaper imports and hence a lower price level. Our 
                                                 
16 This is similar to an analysis in which we would have discarded the policy variables altogether from 
the estimation (as is done in most applications) and then analyze the error country by country. The 
problem with such an approach is that it leads to a missing variable bias and can not be performed by 
simply correlating the residual with the policy variable in a second step. 
17 We also employed the PPP measure as robustness check without finding any major difference. More 
information on the estimation and the results are available on request. 21 
 
proxy is the sum of exports and imports over GDP. KAOPEN it is the index by Chinn 
and Ito (2006). GOVit stands for the size of the government which is assumed to 
increase the relative importance of non tradeables in domestic consumption leading to 
a more appreciated exchange rate. We measure GOVit by the government 
consumption share in GDP. The policy variable is given by Zit=RESit, which stands 
for the reserve to GDP ratio. All variables are in logs except for the KAOPENit index.  
 
Estimation Results: 
X:\  RER:  P-Lev.  P-Level P-Level RER  RER  REER REER 
PROD   0.22***   0.59***   0.63***   0.39***   0.44***   0.36***   0.34*** 
OPEN  -0.11*** -0.17*** -0.13***  -0.24***  -0.24***  -0.25*** -0.21*** 
GOV   0.08***   0.04***   0.04***   0.06***   0.07***   0.08***   0.07*** 
KAOPEN   0.00   0.02***   0.01***   0.004*   0.00   0.01*   0.00 
Z  No No  Yes  No  Yes  No Yes 
Fixed Ef.   No Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes 
N. of Obs. 
















2 (within)  0.68 0.68  0.84  0.46  0.64  0.45 0.58 
 
C. The External Competitiveness Index (ECI) 
The external competitiveness index is similar to the concept of a nominal effective 
exchange rate. But rather than contrasting the relative competitiveness of exports to 
imports it compares the competitiveness of the own exports relative to the exports of 
the competitors in third markets. The value is computed in two steps. In a first step the 
competitiveness in all major export markets k is determined by subtracting from 
country  i’s appreciation against currency k the weighted appreciation of all other 
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where the weights are given by the respective market share of exporter j in market k 
adjusted by the market share of country i in market k such that the sum of the shares 
adds up to unity. The overall index change is the weighted relative appreciation in the 
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where the weights are given by the relative importance of market k for total exports of 
country i which sum to unity. The depicted index is calculated by defining a base year 
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The weights are computed using constant 2006 trade shares. The sample includes 137 
exporting/importing countries. 
 